Measuring Innovation in European Industry

This paper analyses the results of the 1993 Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Fifty per cent of European firms introduced a product or process innovation during 1990-92. The share of innovating firms varies between industrial sectors and firm size. The percentage of innovating firms is higher for large firms than for smaller ones. In high-tech sectors this share is two thirds and for traditional ones is one third. The largest part of firms' expenditure for innovation is linked to the adoption and diffusion of technologies through machinery and equipment, which absorbs 50% of firms' innovation expenditure. R&D activities represent, on average, 20% of total innovation expenditure while other innovative activities, such as design and trial production, account respectively for 10% and 11%. The mix of innovation inputs, especially R&D and investment, is strongly correlated with firm size, displays little change across countries and varies greatly across industries.     

Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games

Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. With a few exceptions, these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In three large experiments, we investigate whether social framing effects are also present in Dictator games. Since only one of the subjects makes a decision, the frame can affect behavior merely through preferences. In all the experiments, we find that behavior is insensitive to social framing. We discuss how to reconcile the absence of social framing effects in Dictator games with the presence of social framing effects in Ultimatum games.     

The Problem of Optimum Stratification

Abstract

Although most applications of stratified sampling represent sampling from a finite population, π(N), consisting of k mutually exclusive sub-populations or strata, n, (N,), it is for purposes of theoretical investigations convenient to deal with a hypothetical population n, represented by a distribution function f(y), a < y < b. This hypothetical population likewise consists of k mutually exclusive strata, π_i , i = 1,.2 ... k. The mean of this population is µ_i being the mean of ni. By means of a random sample of n observations, n_i of which are selected from π_i , µ, is estimated by: being the estimate of µ_i .     

Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening

We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenomenon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are profitably detracted from the candidate pooling contract.     

Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records

We show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms. We develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs. We present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using Danish tax records. First, larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities. Second, kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities. Third, the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers' aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium. Our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods.     

Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining

We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent, the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded, sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less aggressively than under complete information, giving rise to disagreement and/or underinvestment. Our experiment support these predictions.     

On the Consistency of Merger Policy

This paper presents a way to get around the information problem facing outside analysts who want to scrutinize competition authorities' decisions. A formal model of how decisions are taken is applied to infer information that is available to the authorities but not to the outside analyst. If the information thus inferred from several decisions is incompatible, it is claimed that the policy executed by the competition authorities is inconsistent. A case study is presented of two recent decisions by the Norwegian Competition Authority on proposed mergers in the Norwegian insurance industry, indicating they most likely were mutually inconsistent.     

Delegation of Regulation*

We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government. The preference bias and the private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation. Allowing for constrained delegation, we introduce the concepts of weak and strict delegation. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces with bureaucratic drift, while the effect of increased uncertainty about the firm’s technology depends on how that uncertainty changes.     

Knowledge, internationalization of the firm, and inward-outward connections

Even though outward operations such as exports and foreign investment have received most of the attention so far, the internationalization of businesses also includes activities that are inwardly oriented. Inward activities like purchases of machinery, the procurement of raw materials and semifinished goods provide opportunities for building relations with foreign actors. They also offer opportunities to learn about foreign trade techniques and ways of using various operation modes, and by active use of such knowledge companies should be in a better position to start or extend outward foreign operations. This paper presents a case study of the Norwegian company Moelven Industrier ASA and its operations in the Russian market. It shows that the creation and utilization of knowledge through inward-outward connections face many obstacles and that, in Moelven's case, the full potential of such connections was seldom realized.